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THE MARYLAND MECHANICS' LIEN LAW -
ITS SCOPE AND EFFECT
By MITCHELL S. CUTLER* and LEONARD SHAPIRO**
In 1791 Maryland enacted the first mechanics' lien law in the
United States.' This early act applied to the City of Washington
and had been urged by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to stimu-
late and encourage the rapid building of that city.2 It gave a lien to
"the undertaker, or workmen, employed by the person for whose use
the house shall be built." Maryland's present mechanics' lien statute3
favors not only those who contract with the owner but also workmen,
materialmen and other subcontractors who contract only with an inter-
vening contractor who has dealt with the owner. The purpose of this
article is to survey the current mechanics' lien law of Maryland with
special emphasis on the rights of such subcontractors, using the term
subcontractors broadly to include all those supplying work or ma-
terials to the general contractor or to another subcontractor. The
following broad topics will be examined: the type of claims for which
liens may be obtained; the classes of property to which liens will
attach; loss of lien rights by waiver, estoppel or release; the procedural
requirements of notice and filing; and the priority of mechanics' liens
over other liens. Finally, certain reforms will be suggested.
Generally, the courts purport to construe the mechanics' lien laws
most liberally on behalf of the subcontractor and materialmen, rea-
soning that the owner receives the benefit of the labor or materials
supplied, that he controls the money, and that it should therefore be
incumbent upon him to make the necessary appropriation on behalf
of the subcontractor. If the owner pays out money to the general
contractor without taking reasonable precautions to see that it is prop-
erly applied, then he, rather than the subcontractor, must bear the
loss.4 Courts are reluctant to deny the subcontractor recovery of
money owing to him for labor or materials supplied, primarily because
they feel that he is unable to protect himself once he has delivered
the materials or supplied the labor. Typically, the subcontractor has
no contract with the owner of the land, while, at the same time, his
contract with the builder often proves to be of no significant benefit.5
However, despite the tendency to interpret the mechanics' lien
law in favor of subcontractors, the Maryland Court of Appeals has
consistently held that a mechanics' lien exists only by virtue of the
mechanics' lien statute and that no lien exists for anything that falls
* B.S., 1955, Georgetown University; J.D., 1958, George Washington Uni-
versity; Editor-in-Chief, George Washington Law Review, 1957-58; Partner, Foreman,
Cutler and Diamond, Washington, D.C.
** B.S., 1964, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1967, Georgetown University;
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1. Ch. 45, § 10 [1791] MD. LAWS.
2. W. ROCKSL, MECHANIcS LIENS § 1 (1909).
3. MD. ANN. CODn art. 63, §§ 1-52 (1968).
4. Bounds v. Nuttle, 181 Md. 400, 406, 30 A.2d 263, 266 (1943).
5. See Reisterstown Lumber Co. v. Reeder, 224 Md. 499, 507, 168 A.2d 385,
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outside the statutory provision.6 At times the court has emphasized
that it has no power to extend the designs and requirements of
the statute.
7
NATURE OF THE DEBT FOR WHICH A LIEN
MAY BE OBTAINED
What Constitutes a "Building"?
The Maryland mechanics' lien statute provides:
Every building erected and every building repaired, rebuilt or
improved to the extent of one fourth its value in Baltimore City
and in any of the counties shall be subject to a lien for the pay-
ment of all debts contracted for work done for or about the
same, and for materials furnished for or about the same, includ-
ing the drilling and installation of wells for the purpose of
supplying water, the construction or installation of any swimming
pools, the sodding, seeding or planting in or about the premises,
of any shrubs, trees, plants, flowers or nursery products of any
kind or description and the grading, filling, landscaping, and
paving thereon. 8
Determination of whether a claimant is entitled to a lien under this
provision requires interpretation of the word "building" and of the
phrase "debts contracted for work done for or about [the building],
and for materials furnished for or about the same." In Freeform
Pools, Inc. v. Strawbridge Home for Boys, Inc.,9 the Court of
Appeals was faced with the claim of a contractor for a mechanics'
lien for the construction of a swimming pool. At that time, the statute
did not expressly include swimming pools. The court held that a
swimming pool was not a "building" within the meaning of the statute
and denied the claim. The somewhat vague definition of "building"
advanced by the court was as follows: "Taken in its broadest sense
['building'] can mean only an erection intended for use and occu-
pancy as a habitation, or for some purpose of trade, manufacture,
ornament, or use, such as a house, store, or a church. . . . The word
'building' cannot be said to include every type of structure on land."'"
In addition to dictionary references, the Freeform court relied
on the fact that the legislature has repeatedly amended the statute to
allow mechanics' liens for such things as grading and landscaping,
inferring that if the legislature had intended to include a lien for
swimming pool construction it would have so specified. The court's
6. In Freeform Pools, Inc. v. Strawbridge Home for Boys, Inc., 228 Md. 297,
302, 179 A.2d 683, 685 (1962), the Court of Appeals stated: "A mechanics' lien was
unknown at common law, nor was it allowed in equity .... While it was said that
a mechanics' lien rests upon an equitable basis, yet without the benefit of a statute a
court of equity cannot assume jurisdiction."
7. Freeform Pools, Inc. v. Strawbridge Home for Boys, Inc., 228 Md. 297,
179 A.2d 683 (1962) ; House v. Fissell, 188 Md. 160, 51 A.2d 669 (1947) ; Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Lacios, 121 Md. 686, 89 A. 323 (1913).
8. MD. ANN. COD art. 63, § 1 (1968).
9. 228 Md. 297, 179 A.2d 683 (1962).
10. Id. at 301, 179 A.2d at 685.
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suggestion that the legislature, by enumerating such things as grad-
ing and landscaping, was expanding the definition of "building" rather
than the definition of "work done for or about," raises interesting
questions. If the only work done is to dig a well, plant trees or lay
out a road, and there is no structure of any kind on the land, can
the contractor obtain a lien? The Freeform opinion suggests that he
can, although the original intention of the legislature was probably
that there must be a building against which the lien attaches.
In other jurisdictions, courts have interpreted the word "build-
ing" to include a floating wharf boat attached to the bank of a river1
and a flume for the purpose of conveying water to a water wheel.' 2
On the other hand, fencing, fenceposts and gates,' 3 a wall built around
three sides of the stack of a furnace,'4 and seats for use in a pleasure
resort" have all been found not to be included within the definition
of "building." Under the definition of "building" stated by the Court
of Appeals in Freeform Pools, which seems to require suitability for
"use and occupancy," it would appear that among these examples only
the wharf boat could be held to be a "building" under the Mary-
land statute.
"Work Done" or "Materials Furnished for or
About" the Building
Assuming that a building is involved, the claimant must also
show, to obtain a lien, that the work done or materials supplied were
"for or about" the building. Clearly, all materials and labor incor-
porated into actual construction of the "building" are lienable items.
Lienable work "about" the building, however, is arguably limited to
those items expressly designated by the statute, although this inter-
pretation would be contrary to the Freeform Pools rationale.
If the building has only been repaired, rebuilt or improved, the
statute requires that it must be improved to the extent of one fourth
of its value. If the value of the repairs or the materials furnished is
shown to be less than one fourth of the value of the building, no lien
will attach.'" If one of the specifically mentioned items, such as a
well, is deemed itself to be a "building" for the purposes of the statute,
then apparently the well driller would be entitled to a lien without any
showing that the real estate has been enhanced in value, or that his
work was intended to provide service for the proposed structure to be
built on the property.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has twice suggested that a person
who supplies materials for incorporation in a structure may have a
lien even though his materials were not used.' 7 In both of these cases,
however, the record did not reveal whether or not they had been used;
11. Galbreath, Stewart & Co. v. Davidson, 25 Ark. 490 (1869).
12. Derrickson v. Edwards. 29 N.J.L. 468 (Sup. Ct. 1865).
13. Canisius v. Merrill, 65 Ill. 67 (1872).
14. Truesdell v. Gay, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 311 (1859).
15. Lothian v. Wood, 55 Cal. 163 (1880) ; Annot., 1912B Ann. Cas. 5.
16. Parker v. Tilghman V. Morgan, Inc., 170 Md. 7, 183 A. 224 (1936).
17. District Heights Apts. v. Noland Co., 202 Md. 43, 95 A.2d 90 (1953);
Maryland Brick Co. v. Spilman, 76 Md. 337 (1892).
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moreover, the chief issue was whether the claimant must show how
much of his materials went into each particular building in a multi-
structure project. If bricks have been delivered for a building, but
the owner shows clearly that all of the bricks are still stacked and
unused, it is still unclear whether or not the supplier will be entitled
to a lien on the building, although the court in District Heights
Apartments v. Noland Company'" implied that a lien can be obtained
in such a situation.
A subcontractor will often include within his contract price costs
which were not directly attributable to or incorporated in the physical
structure. In House v. Fissel,'9 the question arose whether a me-
chanics' lien would attach for payments of workmen's compensation
and liability insurance premiums, for fuel used in trucks for hauling
materials, for rental for storage of lumber, and for preparing building
plans. The court granted the lien for the amount of the workmen's
compensation and insurance premiums and concluded that although
the gas and oil did not constitute "materials" within the meaning of
the statute, their costs should be considered debts contracted "for or
about" the building and, therefore, were also lienable items. The claim
for storage of lumber and preparation of building plans was, how-
ever, denied.2"
In an earlier case, Basshor v. Baltimore & Ohio Railway,2' it
was held that one who supplies to a materialman the machinery used
to produce materials to be incorporated in a building is not entitled
to a mechanics' lien. The court held that such machinery did not fall
within the meaning of "materials furnished for or about" the building.
However, in Evans Marble Company v. International Trust Com-
pany,22 the court was faced with a claim for a lien for the work of
preparing stone off the building premises, and in addition, for the cost
of erecting that stone. The court held that work done off the building
site was lienable, and that the word "about" in the statute should be
interpreted broadly to mean "concerning", "with regard to" or "touch-
ing". The problem of reconciling the foregoing language taken from
Evans Marble with the holding of Basshor has not proved insur-
mountable. In Basshor, a machine was supplied to a materialman to
enable him to produce materials which would be ultimately incor-
porated in the building structure. The machinery itself was never
intended for incorporation within the structure. The Basshor court
said that materials, within the meaning of the statute, meant such
materials as ordinarily are used in the construction contemplated.
Clearly, the machinery in that case could not qualify on those terms.
Unlike Basshor, the contract in Evans Marble specifically referred to
18. 202 Md. 43, 95 A.2d 90 (1953).
19. 188 Md. 160, 51 A.2d 669 (1947). See also Gill v. Mullan, 140 Md. 1, 116 A.
563 (1922), where a lien was claimed for coal, lubricating oil, etc., used in the running
of the claimant's steamshovel, as well as for depreciation of that shovel. The court
concluded that, although the specific materials were not "materials furnished" within
the meaning of the statute, the value of such articles can be considered lienable items to
be included in the value of "work done."
20. But see Caton Ridge, Inc. v. Bonnett, 245 Md. 268, 225 A.2d 853 (1967).
21. 65 Md. 99, 3 A. 285 (1886).
22. 101 Md. 210, 60 A. 667 (1905).
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the cutting of the stone, and it was reasonably clear that the ultimate
use intended was the incorporation of the stone into the building struc-
ture. Thus, despite frequent reference to Evans Marble as holding
that a lien can be obtained for work done entirely off the job site,
the question of the attachment of a mechanics' lien for work done off
the job site is still unsettled.
Two more recent decisions of the Maryland Court of Appeals
have helped to clarify the problem. In Giles & Ransome, Inc. v. First
National Realty Corporation,23 the Maryland court was asked to rule
that a mechanics' lien could be perfected by a lessor of equipment which
had been leased to a subcontractor for purposes of earth-moving and
grading. The questions presented to the court were (1) whether the
leasing of earth-moving equipment to a grading subcontractor con-
stituted "work done for or about" a building within the meaning of
the mechanics' lien law, and (2) whether a lessor of equipment to a
contractor or subcontractor fell within the class of persons entitled to
a lien. In answering the first question, the court focused on the actual
operation of the equipment, stating that the question would turn on
whether the mechanics who operated the leased equipment were em-
ployed by the lessor or the lessee.24 The court concluded that:
Since it is not disputed that the operators were employees of the
subcontractor (who was the lessee), we think the lessor was not
entitled to a lien either on the theory that the supplying of the
equipment on a rental basis constituted "work done" or on the
theory that the charges for the use of the equipment constituted
a debt "contracted for work done." This is so because the lessor
had done no work for or about the premises. In order for it to
come within the plain meaning and obvious purpose of the statute
it was necessary for it to have actually participated in the per-
formance of the work done, and this necessitated something
more than taking the equipment to the site of the job, keeping it
in running order while it was there, and removing it when the
grading was completed.
We conclude that the rental of equipment without a mechanic
to operate it is not a lienable item under the provisions of § 1
of Art. 63.25
It is suggested that the conclusion reached in this case is inconsistent
with the liberal interpretation heretofore given to the mechanics' lien
law by the Maryland courts. The court distinguished Gill v. Mullan26
and the House case, discussed above, by stating that in Gill the lienor
23. 238 Md. 203, 208 A.2d 582 (1965).
24. Several courts have permitted the attachment of a mechanics' lien for the
leasing of equipment. See Mann v. Schnarr, 228 Ind. 654, 95 N.E.2d 138 (1950);
Timber Structures v. C.W.S. Grinding & Machine Works, 191 Or. 231, 229 P.2d 623(1951); Harris, Inc. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & T.P. Ry., 198 Tenn. 339, 280S.W.2d 800 (1955). In addition, several states, such as Washington, California and
Minnesota, have extended their statutes to include the leasing of equipment.
25. 238 Md. at 206-08, 208 A.2d at 584-85.
26. 140 Md. 1, 116 A. 563 (1922).
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was a subcontractor and in House he was a general contractor. The
court's holding seems to state a mere conclusion rather than to provide
a satisfactory basis for denying the lien. It is submitted that "work
done" or "debts contracted for work done", in order to be consistent
with prior judicial decisions allowing a lien for the rental value of
machinery supplied by a subcontractor, should include the leasing of
equipment. The suggestion made by the court that a lessor, simply
by supplying his own machine operators, can be transformed from an
independent party into a subcontractor is of questionable wisdom in
light of the fact that the court has previously recognized the practical
difficulties of an all-encompassing lien law and has sought to establish
more precise boundaries and standards for future decisions.17
In another case decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals, Caton
Ridge, Inc. v. Bonnett,28 an architect was held entitled to a mechanics'
lien for his combined effort in preparing the plans for and supervising
the erection of a building. The question of the attachment of a lien
solely for the preparation of plans was left unanswered, 29 since the
court based its decision primarily on the fact that the contract, which
provided for both the preparing of plans and the supervision of work,
was indivisible. The compensation for both activities was provided
for in a lump sum and could not practically be apportioned.
An interesting development in the Giles & Ransome case was the
court's implicit suggestion that only those who contracted to supply
materials or labor are within the class of persons entitled to a lien.
The court stated that the provisions of Section 13 of the mechanics'
lien statute"0 "make it apparent that a lessor of equipment to a con-
tractor or subcontractor is not included within the class of persons
entitled to a lien."3" Section 13 permits the owner to retain from the
cost of a building amounts due persons who give proper notice under
Sections 11 and 12,32 but apparently limits that right to cases in which
the "contractor or builder of a building shall have purchased materials
or contracted for work and the party with whom such contract was
made shall have given notice. . . ." A narrow reading of this pro-
vision indicates that if the builder or contractor did not purchase
materials from the claimant or contract for work with him, then the
owner had no right to retain money for that claimant's benefit. Since
27. See also Freeform Pools, Inc. v. Strawbridge Home for Boys, Inc., 228 Md.
297, 179 A.2d 683 (1962).
28. 245 Md. 268, 225 A.2d 853 (1967).
29. In Morris J. Liebergott & Associates v. Investment Bldg. Corp., 249 Md. 584,
241 A.2d 138 (1968), the court reaffirmed its position that, in Caton Ridge, it did
not decide whether an architect who only prepares plans and does not supervise work
was entitled to a lien.
30. MD. ANN. CoDe art. 63, § 13 (1968):§ 13. Owner may retain from cost of building amount of which he has been notified.
In all cases in which a contractor or builder of a building shall have purchased
materials or contracted for work and the party with whom such contract was
made shall have given notice as required in §§ 11 and 12 to the owner of such
building, it shall be lawful for the owner to retain from the cost of such building
the amount which he may ascertain to be due to the party giving such notice;
and in case any lien be laid by the party giving such notice and be also laid by
the contractor or builder, the said contractor or builder shall receive only thedifference between the amount due him and that due the person giving the notice.
31. 238 Md. at 208, 208 A.2d at 585.
32. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 63, §§ 11, 12 (1968).
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the right of retention is the essence of the mechanics' lien law, it would
logically follow that the legislature did not intend that a supplier of
material to a subcontractor be entitled to a lien, since he has no direct
contract or dealings with the contractor. Under the same reasoning,
it would appear that employees of a subcontractor would similarly not
be entitled to a mechanics' lien. Such a case would arise if a subcon-
tractor were paid by a contractor or owner, and the subcontractor sub-
sequently failed to pay his employees. The owner might also argue that
all moneys due had been paid to the necessary persons or firms in
accordance with the second sentence of Section 1 of Article 63. How-
ever, because of the propensity of the Maryland courts to liberally con-
strue the rights of lien claimants, it is unlikely that the narrow reading
discussed above will be accepted. Thus, owners and builders will,
without legislative relief, remain vulnerable to the possibility of double
liability which has characterized the operation of the Maryland me-
chanics' lien law.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that, for the owner to
be liable for the value of goods or labor furnished to the contractor,
"an active and subsisting contract must be established between the
owner and the contractor."3 In T. Dan Kolker, Inc. v. Shure, 3 4 the
court concluded that there is no requirement to establish a binding
contract between the contractor and the materialman and that the
absence of such a contract is no defense to a mechanics' lien claim.
However, in McLaughlin v. Reinhart,33 the court stated that the con-
cept of the mechanics' lien "pre-supposes a contract, express or im-
plied, . . . which existing, the law affixes a lien to secure the payment
of the mechanic or material man, for what is done and furnished. The
right to compensation must exist, or there can be no lien."36 This
statement has been interpreted to mean that, for a right to a lien to
exist, there must be a contract, either express or implied, for doing
that for which the statute gives the lien, and that the lien is designed
to secure the compensation provided in that contract. 7
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO A MECHANICS' LIEN
Generally the lien attaches not only to the building but also to
the land on which the building is erected.3 ' A mechanics' lien may
attach to any interest that is assignable, transferable, mortgageable,
or subject to being sold under execution as a separate and distinct
33. Greenway v. Turner, 4 Md. 296 (1853).
34. 209 Md. 290, 297-98, 121 A.2d 223, 226-27 (1956):
[It is not] incumbent upon the claimant to establish the fact that there was an
express antecedent contract made with respect to the exact quantity of work or
materials to be done or furnished by him. In the absence of evidence of such
express contract, the character of the account, the time within which the work was
done or the materials were furnished, and the object of the work or materials, may
afford proper grounds for the presumption that the work was done or the materials
were furnished with reference to an understanding from the commencement that
such work or materials should be done or furnished, if required by the builder. ...
35. 54 Md. 71 (1880).
36. Id. at 76.
37. See Evans Marble Co. v. International Trust Co., 101 Md. 210, 60 A. 667
(1905).
38. MD. ANN. CODX art. 63, §§ 4, 5 (1968).
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entity, 9 and is not limited to estates held in fee simple. If the building
is erected by a lessee or tenant, the statute provides that the lien "shall
only apply to the extent of the interest of such lessee or tenant."4
In addition to questions relating to the nature of the structure and
the type of work or materials supplied, the character of the estate by
which the parties hold the property can also serve to avoid the attach-
ment of a mechanics' lien. In accord with the prevailing rule, Mary-
land recognizes that an interest of one spouse in an estate by the
entireties is not subject to the individual debts of the other spouse.
Noting that a tenant by the entireties in Maryland has no separate
interest in the property which can be seized and sold on execution,
and therefore made subject to a judgment lien against him alone, the
court in Blenard v. Blenard41 held that a tenant by the entireties has
no separate interest which can be subjected to a mechanics' lien for
a debt which he has alone contracted. However, a mechanics' lien
can and will attach to the individual interest of one or more tenants
in common without affecting the interests of the other co-tenants. In
Dente v. Bullisj 2 Ulrich and Dente were tenants in common in fee
simple of a large tract of land. Dente contracted with Bullis to con-
struct a house on part of the property, for which Bullis later attempted
to assert his mechanics' lien. Because Bullis failed to satisfy the
statute by notifying Ulrich of his intention to claim a lien, the court
held that Ulrich's interest as a tenant in common was not subject
to the mechanics' lien. It did, however, permit the attachment of the
lien as to Dente's interest, concluding that when materials are fur-
nished on the contract of one tenant in common in possession, a lien
can be entered against his interest in the premises. This holding con-
forms to the decisions on this issue in the majority of jurisdictions.
FORFEITURE OF LIEN RIGHTS
Despite the efforts of the legislature and the courts to protect
laborers and materialmen by the creation and subsequent interpreta-
tion of the mechanics' lien law, it has been consistently held that a
waiver by the contractor or subcontractor of his lien rights will pre-
clude him from asserting them. In Benson v. Borden,4" Judge Mitchell
used the following language in discussing the difference between waiver
and estoppel, which are often treated as synonymous:
While waiver belongs to the family of estoppel, and the doctrine
of estoppel lies at the foundation of the law of waiver, they are
nevertheless distinguishable terms. . . . Waiver is the voluntary
surrender of a right; estoppel is the inhibition to assert it from
the mischief that has followed. Waiver involves both knowledge
39. See McClintic-Marshall Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 254 Mich. 305, 236 N.W.
792 (1931).
40. MD. ANN. CODt art. 63, § 9 (1968). It is also interesting and important to
note that the Maryland court has held that a materialman's lien will attach to specified
building lots in spite of the fact that the owner of the lots upon which the houses were
built had only an equitable interest. Goldheim v. Clark, 68 Md. 498, 13 A. 363 (1888).
41. 185 Md. 548, 45 A.2d 335 (1946).
42. 196 Md. 238, 76 A.2d 158 (1950).
43. 174 Md. 202, 198 A. 419 (1938).
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and intention; estoppel may arise where there is no intent to mis-
lead. Waiver depends upon what one himself intends to do;
estoppel depends rather upon what he causes his adversary to do.
Waiver involves the acts and conduct of only one of the parties;
estoppel involves the conduct of both. A waiver does not neces-
sarily imply that one has been misled to his prejudice or into an
altered position; an estoppel always involves this element ...
Estoppel may carry the implication of fraud, waiver does not.
A waiver may be created by acts, conduct or declarations in-
sufficient to create a technical estoppel."
For the purposes of this article the principles of waiver, estoppel and
release or satisfaction, will be discussed separately.
Waiver
In some jurisdictions, an owner of land can protect himself from
a mechanics' lien by giving a promissory note to the subcontractor. 45
In those jurisdictions, the taking of the note serves as a waiver of the
right to a mechanics' lien. The owner of the land takes the position
that the note fully substitutes and replaces the original obligation
which is the basis of the lien claim. However, in Maryland, the
mechanics' lien statute provides that the granting of a credit or the
receiving of notes or other securities does not constitute a waiver of
a mechanics' lien unless such notes were received as payment or the
lien was expressly waived.46 The presumption seems to be that notes
are taken as security for or evidence of the debt rather than as actual
payment. In Wix v. Bowling,4 7 notes were given by the owner of the
property to the materialman, who in turn transferred the same notes
to one of his suppliers. At maturity, the supplier accepted new notes
from the owner with the knowledge and consent of the materialman-
lienor. On the basis of these facts, the court held against the lien
claimant, because his disposal of the note constituted a waiver of his
lien."' The court stated:
[I]n the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, or
some agreement inconsistent with the existence of a lien, the
person having a lien does not waive it by taking notes for the
amount due him, unless they are received as payment.... [T]he
mere acceptance of the note of a debtor does not justify the pre-
sumption that it was received as payment of a pre-existing debt.
44. Id. at 219-20, 198 A. at 427.
45. In Indiana, Maine and Massachusetts, the taking of the notes evidently raises
the presumption that they were given as payment, so as to waive the lien right. For an
excellent discussion of waiver by the taking or negotiating of an unsecured note of
the owner or contractor, see Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 425 (1963).
46. MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 3 (1968) provides:
No person having such lien shall be considered as waiving the same by granting
a credit or receiving notes or other securities, unless the same be received as
payment or the lien be expressly waived, but the sole effect thereof shall be to
prevent the institution of any proceedings to enforce said lien until the expiration
of the time agreed upon.
47. 120 Md. 265, 87 A. 759 (1913).
48. Id. at 273, 87 A. at 762.
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Nor would the transfer of the note by a person entitled to a lien
for work done and materials furnished amount to a waiver of his
lien. But where the claimant indorses the note to a third person,
who, when the note comes due, with the knowledge and assent
of the claimant . . . so disposes of the new note that it is beyond
the control of and cannot be produced or satisfactorily accounted
for by the claimant, the inference does arise that he regarded
the note as payment of his claim, and that he waived his lien.4"
The court distinguished Blake v. Pitcher,50 where the receipt of a
promissory note for part of the purchase price of materials was held
not to extinguish that portion of the claim covered by the note, on
the grounds that: (1) the note was not given by the owner of the
property, but instead by the contractor, and (2) no evidence was
offered to show that the lien claimants had transferred or negotiated
the note.5
Generally, the courts have held, pursuant to the terms of the
statute, that the taking of security will not constitute a waiver. In
Maryland Brick Company v. Spilman,52 Maryland Brick, the lienor,
received three mortgages as collateral security for a debt. The court,
discussing whether the receipt of the securities constituted a waiver
of the lien right, observed that the testimony abundantly showed that
the terms of sale included the giving of the mortgage as security only,
and that nothing which transpired indicated either an express or im-
plied waiver. The court concluded that a mechanics' lien will not be
considered as waived unless the parties have "expressly agreed to
such terms as are inconsistent with its existence and enforcement, in
which case the lien is waived by the legal effect of such contract."5 "
There is authority to the contrary, however. In Pinning v. Skipper,4
the Pinnings contracted to supply sand, dig foundations and cellars,
and grade the yards and pavements for property owned by Skipper.
A provision of the contract stipulated that the Pinnings agreed to give
to Skipper "a good lien bond as a bar against liens upon said houses
or either of them," for work done or material furnished, or for labor
or hire. As part of the consideration for the contract, the Pinnings
did in fact give to Skipper their bond, conditioned on their perform-
ance of the terms of the contract. Holding that the agreement to take
a mortgage to secure the price of the work constituted a waiver of
the lien, the court said:
There may be some difficulty as to the construction and effect
of this contract in other respects, but we find none in determining
49. Id.
50. 46 Md. 453 (1877).
51. A typical decision is Frederick County Nat'l Bank v. Dunn, 125 Md. 392,
398, 93 A. 984, 986 (1915), where the court stated: "There was some reference made
in the briefs to the fact that Dunn had received a note of Mclver for $1,000 but that
can in no way affect this controversy, as the proof fails to show that the note was
received in payment of that amount."
52. 76 Md. 337, 25 A. 297 (1892).
53. Id. at 345, 25 A. at 299.
54. 71 Md. 347, 18 A. 659 (1889).
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that it is utterly inconsistent with the enforcement of a mechanics'
lien against either of these houses by the appellants. The stipula-
tion that they would give a bond "as a bar against liens upon
said houses, or either of them," and the giving of the bond con-
ditioned for the faithful performance of their part of the contract,
clearly, in our judgment, constitute in law a waiver of the lien
sought to be enforced in this suit. The filing of this lien claim
was a breach of the contract, and consequently of the condition of
the accompanying bond.5
The court also held that a breach of the contract by the owner does not
revive the right to a lien which has been waived. 6
The waiver need not be made directly to the owner. A contract
between a principal contractor and a subcontractor or materialman
wherein the latter waived his rights to a mechanics' lien or agreed not
to file a lien would be held valid and effective and would preclude the
subcontractor from enforcing a lien.5" However, there is judicial con-
flict as to whether a "no lien" provision in a contract between the
principal contractor and the owner binds a subcontractor. The courts
that have bound the subcontractor to such a waiver have required that
the subcontractor have actual notice of the "no lien" provision. The
greater weight of authority, however, supports the position that the
owner and principal contractor cannot, by a provision against liens
in their contract, defeat the rights of subcontractors. 9 The issue has
yet to be presented to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Estoppel
A subcontractor will also be denied his right to a lien if his con-
duct has been such as to estop him from claiming the right. As in the
ordinary estoppel situation, the conduct of the subcontractor, upon
which the owner relies, is the basis for denying the subcontractor his
right to a lien, with each case turning on its own particular facts. In
Crane Company v. Onley,60 the owner offered to pay the subcontractor
personally, whereupon the subcontractor told the owner that he could
pay the amount due directly to the contractor. The court held that
the subcontractor was estopped from subsequently perfecting his me-
chanics' lien right against the owner's property when the contractor
55. Id. at 350, 18 A. at 660. Accord, Willison v. Douglas, 66 Md. 99, 6 A. 530
(1886).
56. 71 Md. at 350-51, 18 A. at 661. Accord, Jankoviak v. Butcher, 22 Ill. App.
2d 126, 159 N.E.2d 377 (1959); Mitchell v. Wrightstown Community Apts., 4 N.J.
Super. 321, 67 A.2d 203 (1949); Cummings v. Broadway-94th Street Realty Co., 233
N.Y. 407, 135 N.E. 832, reargument denied, 234 N.Y. 534, 138 N.E. 436 (1922).
57. See Kennedy v. National Sur. Co., 111 Cal. App. 306, 295 P. 359 (1931);
Mintzes Contracting Co. v. County Wood Homes Corp., 202 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).
58. E.g., Stein v. Pennsylvania Dock & Warehouse Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 568, 159
A. 683 (Cir. Ct. 1932).
59. See Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1098 (1961).
60. 194 Md. 43, 69 A.2d 903 (1949).
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failed to pay him. 6' After referring to Pomeroy's definition of equitable
estoppel,62 the court stated:
According to the testimony, appellant by its voluntary action
told Mr. Onely to pay Stark directly. Onley in good faith did
exactly what appellant told him to do and relied upon the repre-
sentation made to him by appellant. The appellant is thereby
absolutely precluded both in law and in equity from asserting the
mechanics' lien to which it might have otherwise been entitled.6"
In J.F. Johnson Lumber Company v. Magruder,64 the appellee-
owner relied on the statement of the appellant-materialman that he
need not worry about requiring a completion bond from the builder
because the appellant held him in high esteem and would give him all
the credit he needed. The court pointed out that the owner had, by
the express terms of his contract, the ability to protect himself by
simply demanding that the contractor submit receipts or other evidence
of payment showing that all labor and materials furnished for the
building had been paid in full. The failure of the owner to so protect
himself, in spite of the statements made by the appellant, precluded
the invocation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the material-
man's assertion of a lien. The court concluded, according to general
equitable principles, that one who claims the benefit of an equitable
estoppel must not only be free from fraud in the transaction, but he
must also have acted to assert his rights; otherwise no equity will
arise in his favor. 5 The court referred to Bounds v. Nuttle,66 where
responsibility for protecting against the potential attachment of a
mechanics' lien was held to fall entirely on the owner, because he has
ultimate control of the application of funds expended and because he
receives the ultimate benefit. Thus, it seems, strong evidence is re-
quired to preclude a subcontractor's claim on the basis of estoppel.
61. See also Dickerson Lumber Co. v. Herson, 230 Md. 487, 187 A.2d 689 (1963)(failure to properly apply funds received estopped subsequent attempt to perfect
materialman's lien right); Goldman v. Brinton, 90 Md. 259, 44 A. 1029 (1889)
(lienor's conduct held to estop his perfecting the lien).
62. 2 J. POMxROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804 (4th ed. 1918):
[T]he effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely pre-
cluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps
have otherwise existed either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against
another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led
thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some
corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.
63. 194 Md. at 50, 69 A.2d at 907.
64. 218 Md. 440, 147 A.2d 208 (1958).
65. See Reisterstown Lumber Co. v. Reider, 224 Md. 499, 168 A.2d 385 (1961),
where the statement of an officer of a lumber company to a homeowner as to the
reliability of the contractor with whom the owner had previously contracted for con-
struction of a home was similarly found not to estop the lumber company from assert-
ing a lien for building materials furnished to the contractor. The court made refer-
ence to the owner's ability to withhold progress payments to the contractor for
unpaid bills, as was similarly mentioned in Johnson Lumber. See also Caltrider v.
Weant, 147 Md. 338, 128 A. 72 (1925).
66. 181 Md. 400, 30 A.2d 263 (1943).
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Release or Satisfaction
Just as a subcontractor can be estopped from claiming a lien
because of his conduct, an express release,6 7 supported by considera-
tion discharging the property from liens for work done and materials
supplied either before or after its execution, will also serve to extin-
guish the subcontractor's right to the lien. However, in Sodini v.
Winter,"' an oral relinquishment of the right to a mechanics' lien,
without consideration, was deemed ineffectual. In that case, the sub-
contractor said he would look solely to the contractor for payment,
but this reliance on the contractor's credit alone was deemed in-
sufficient to establish a release of the lien. Generally, for a release
to be an effective protection for the owner, the language of release
must be clear and unambiguous, since all ambiguities will be resolved
against the owner of the land, and since, as indicated by Sodini, the
release must be supported by valuable consideration. Moreover, the
lien of the subcontractor will probably not be affected by an agree-
ment between the subcontractor and the contractor compromising or
adjusting their claim without the prior consent of the owner.69
Payment to the subcontractor of the money owed him, which if
unpaid would give rise to a lien right, will also serve to satisfy the
statute. 70 However, where a subcontractor receives payments from the
principal contractor without directions as to their application, he can,
as against the owner, apply a part of the payments to an item for
which he could not claim a lien.7 ' In Bounds v. Nuttle,"2 the court
went even further, stating that the subcontractor could apply the
money to debts owed him by the principal contractor on other jobs,
provided there was no contrary agreement or arrangement for the
application of the money:
Contractors building a number of houses frequently have
separate accounts with materialmen. The contractor can apply
his money on any bill he owes. It does not have to be applied on
the bill for the materials for the house from the contract for
which he obtained it. The contractor's obligation to the owner
is to finish and turn over the house without liens, but this does
not prevent him from using his receipts from one contract to pay
on another. Nor does it prevent the material man from having
his lien, unless he agrees that it shall be done this way, in order
67. It is interesting to note that title company standard waiver forms have been
held in the majority of cases to constitute only a release of priority by the subcontrac-
tor. In such cases the subcontractor is said to retain his lien right as against the owner.
However, an Ohio court in Kocher v. Ricketts, 25 Ohio Op. 383, 49 N.E.2d 85 (Ct.
App. 1942), has ruled that the waiver language in the title company form waived all
rights to the lien held by the subcontractor and bound the subcontractor as against the
owner. In Perper v. Fayed, 247 Md. 639, 234 A.2d 144 (1967), a waiver "in favor
of . . . every party making a loan on said real estate" was held to be only a waiver
of priority and not of the lien itself.
68. 32 Md. 130 (1870).
69. See Yonkers Bldg. Supply Co. v. Petro Luciano & Sons, 269 N.Y. 171, 199
N.E. 45 (1935).
70. See MD. ANN. CoDn art. 63, § 1 (1968).
71. Frederick County Nat'l Bank v. Dunn, 125 Md. 392,93 A. 984 (1915).
72. 181 Md. 400, 30 A.2d 263 (1943).
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that he may get his other bills paid and may collect double from
the owner. That, of course, would be a fraud.73
Probably the best, though not usually the most practical, solution would
be to make payments directly to the subcontractors.
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO CLAIM A LIEN
Unless the claimant's contract for work and/or materials is with
the owner, the claimant must give notice to the owner of his intention
to claim a lien within ninety days after furnishing the work or ma-
terials.74 Failure to give the required notice within the stipulated
time may deprive the subcontractor of his right to claim the lien.75
However, the sending of the letter of notice by registered or certified
mail within the required period,7" may satisfy the notice requirement.7 7
The purpose of the notice provision is to protect owners of prop-
erty against possible double liability.78 An owner who has received
notice is permitted to retain, out of money payable to the builder,
the amount claimed by the materialman.7" No notice is required if
the claimant has contracted with the owner himself8 0 or with his
agent. However, unless a contractual relationship is clearly shown,
73. Id. at 408, 30 A.2d at 267.
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 11 (1968)
(a) Generally. - If the contract for furnishing such work or materials, or
both, shall have been made with any architect or builder or any other person
except the owner of the lot on which the building may be erected, or his agent,
the person so doing work or furnishing materials, or both, shall not be entitled
to a lien unless, within ninety days after furnishing the same, he or his agent
shall give notice in writing to such owner or agent, if resident within the city or
county, of his intention to claim such lien.
(b) Property owned by husband and wife. - For the purposes of notice in
this section where property is owned by husband and wife, either jointly or as
tenants by the entireties, and said husband and wife are not separated or divorced,
then said notice above referred to shall be sufficient as to delivery if received by
either husband or wife.
(c) Notice to person whose name appears in assessment books. - Notice
given to the person appearing as taxpayer in the assessment books of the county
where the lot is situated shall constitute sufficient notice to all actual owners.
75. MD. ANN. Cone art. 63, § 11(a) (1968). See Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ. ex rel. Carrier Corp. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 245 Md. 192, 225 A.2d 448 (1967).
76. Cf. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 90, § 11(c) (1964). This statute deals with the
analagous problem of notice of suit on payment bonds.
77. Cf. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. ex rel. Carrier Corp. v. Glassman
Constr. Co., 245 Md. 192, 225 A.2d 448 (1967), involving notice under a labor and
materials payment bond. But see Jakenjo, Inc. v. Blizzard, 221 Md. 46, 155 A.2d 661(1959); Bukowitz v. Maryland Lumber Co., 210 Md. 148, 122 A.2d 486 (1956).
78. Noland Co. v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 273 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1959).
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 13 (1968):
In all cases in which a contractor or builder of a building shall have purchased
materials or contracted for work and the party with whom such contract was
made shall have given notice as required in §§ 11 and 12 to the owner of such
building, it shall be lawful for the owner to retain from the cost of such building
the amount which he may ascertain to be due to the party giving such notice;
and in case any lien be laid by the party giving such notice and be also laid by
the contractor or builder, the said contractor or builder shall receive only the
difference between the amount due him and that due the person giving the notice.
See G. Edgar Harr Sons v. Newton, 220 Md. 618, 155 A.2d 480 (1959); William
Penn Supply Corp. v. Watterson, 218 Md. 291, 146 A.2d 420 (1958).
80. Wilhelm v. Roe, 158 Md. 615, 149 A. 438 (1930); First Nat'l Bank v. White,
114 Md. 615, 79 A. 1085 (1911) ; Rust v. Chisolm, 57 Md. 376 (1882).
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each tenant in common, owner, or part owner is entitled to receive, per-
sonally or through his agent, written notice of any intention to claim
a lien."1 This rule was also applied to tenants by the entireties in
Bukowitz v. Maryland Lumber Company,2 decided prior to the 1959
amendment which added Section 11(b) to Article 63. That amend-
ment provides that where property is held by husband and wife either
jointly or as tenants by the entireties, notice received by either spouse
satisfies the requirement of the statute.13  It is not clear, however,
whether a claimant who has contracted with one tenant by the entire-
ties must still give notice to the other. Perhaps the contract itself
should constitute sufficient notice, in accordance with the general
scheme of the statute.
The general requirement of Section 11 is that the notice of the
intention of the subcontractor to claim a mechanics' lien must be filed
X1within ninety days after furnishing" the materials or doing the
work. 4 Determining when the work or material has been "furnished"
can be a difficult problem. In G. Edgar Harr Sons v. Newton,85 the
issue was whether the subcontractor Harr had filed timely notice of
his intention to claim a lien. The court held that even though the
majority of the work and materials is furnished more than 90 days
before notice is given, the crucial date is the date of completion if the
various undertakings were performed pursuant to one indivisible con-
tract. In United States v. Allied Contractors, Inc.,86 the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, construing the notice
provision of the Miller Act," which is very similar to that of the Mary-
land mechanics' lien law, held that in the absence of a continuing
contract to furnish materials on a project, notice must be given within
ninety days of furnishing material under each separate order. Clearly,
where materials are furnished for separate and distinct purposes, or
under different contracts, even though they are intended to be used by
the contractor or builder in executing the same contract with the owner,
the right to a lien must date from the time of furnishing the different
81. Dente v. Bullis, 196 Md. 238, 76 A.2d 158 (1950).
82. 210 Md. 148, 122 A.2d 486 (1956). The court found that no agency existed
between the husband and wife and thus notice to the husband only was insufficient.
83. See also MD. ANN. Cong art. 63, § 10 (1968) :
Where a building shall be erected on a lot of ground belonging to a married
woman by her husband or some person by him employed the said lien shall not
attach unless notice thereof be given to such married woman in writing within
ninety days after doing such work or furnishing such materials, or both, as the
case may be.
This section indicates a legislative purpose to require personal notice to the wife and
negates any implication of agency arising out of the marital relationship itself.
84. As stated in Bukowits, this "requirement of timely notice of intention must be
at least substantially complied with." 210 Md. at 152, 122 A.2d at 488. In Kenly
ex rel. Otto v. Sisters of Charity, 63 Md. 306, 309 (1885), the court said:
The foundation of the lien, in a case like the one before us, is the prior notice to
be given to the owner. It is required for the protection of the owner, who is
authorized to retain in his hands the amount due to the party giving the notice.
It must be given in writing and served on the owner, or his agent, if they are
resident of the city or county where the building is erected. If such notice cannot
be given personally on account of absence, or other causes, the claimant may
then place the notice on the building.
85. 220 Md. 618, 155 A.2d 480 (1959).
86. 171 F. Supp. 569 (D. Md. 1959).
87. 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1964).
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parcels of materials, and not from the last item in the account. On
the other hand, if all of the materials are furnished for the same gen-
eral purpose, and if the various undertakings are so connected as to
show that the parties contemplated that all of the deliveries form one
continuous undertaking, the entire account should be treated as a single
contract.88  Occasionally goods will be delivered for the sole purpose
of extending the time within which a claim for a lien may be filed or
notice may be served on the owner. It is established, however, that
the claimant cannot ". . . extend the time within which the lien may
be filed by doing or furnishing small additional items under the guise
of the original contract. ' ' 89  This principle also applies to the notice
requirement of the statute. 90 However, in Reisterstown Lumber Com-
pany v. Reeder,9 the court examined the evidence and determined
that the last delivery of materials was within the contemplation of
the parties and was in fact made at the request of the owner and
builder. Because, in that case, the delivery was made pursuant to an
express clause in the contract which provided for the replacement of
defective parts, the date of the last delivery was the date of completion,
from which time the statutory period for notice began to run. In
several other cases, the court has held that materials were not fur-
nished for the purpose of extending the statutory time period, and
thus the notice was held to be timely.92 Generally, if the furnishing
of additional work or materials is necessary for the proper completion
of the contract, the statutory period begins to run at that time, even
if they are not furnished at the request of the owner.93
The statute states that the subcontractor "shall give notice in
writing to such owner or agent, if resident within the city or county,
of his intention to claim such lien."94 It has been held that oral notice
is not sufficient9" and that prior oral notice does not relieve the ma-
terialman from the obligation of stating the particulars of the claim
in a subsequent written notice.96 In Mashkes v. JakenJo, Inc.,97 the
court indicated the degree of specificity required for adequate notice.
In that case it was held that since the contract was for a single in-
88. United States v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D. Md.
1959) ; District Heights Apts. v. Noland Co., 202 Md. 43, 52, 95 A.2d 90, 94 (1953).
89. See Reisterstown Lumber Co. v. Reeder, 224 Md. 499, 507, 168 A.2d 385,
389 (1961).
90. Greenway v. Turner, 4 Md. 296 (1853). In Brunt v. Farinholt-Meredith Co.,
121 Md. 126, 88 A. 42 (1913), the court said that since notice was for the protection
of the owner, it was important that the materialman not be permitted to extend the
statutory time period within which he is required to give notice. See also T. Dan
Kolker, Inc. v. Shure, 209 Md. 290, 121 A.2d 223 (1956) ; District Heights Apts. v.
Noland Co., 202 Md. 43, 95 A.2d 90 (1953).
91. 224 Md. 499, 168 A.2d 385 (1961).
92. Mt. Airy Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Grey Dawn Dev. Co., 237 Md. 38,
205 A.2d 299 (1964) ; Brosenne v. Warthen, 226 Md. 168, 172 A.2d 485 (1961). See
T. Dan Kolker, Inc. v. Shure, 209 Md. 290, 121 A.2d 223 (1956); District Heights
Apts. v. Noland Co., 202 Md. 43, 95 A.2d 90 (1953).
93. Mt. Airy Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Grey Dawn Dev. Co., 237 Md. 38, 205
A.2d 299 (1964).
94. MD. ANN. CoD art. 63, § 11(a) (1968).
95. Welch v. Humphrey. 200 Md. 410,90 A.2d 686 (1952).
96. The statute only requires that the claimant give notice in writing, and it does
not specify the mode or manner, so long as it actually reaches the owner or his duly
authorized agent. Jakenjo, Inc. v. Blizzard, 221 Md. 46, 155 A.2d 661 (1959).
97. 220 Md. 457, 154 A.2d 439 (1959) (per curiam).
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divisible undertaking to do all the electrical work, written notice
stating (1) that the work was done "as per plans and specifications"
which were sufficiently identified so that the owner could have referred
to them, and (2) that "all of which work done and materials sup-
plied (including specified extras and deletions) has been furnished
within ninety days last past" gave the owner adequate information
and was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 11
of the statute.
Apparently the exact time when the work was performed or the
materials supplied need not be specified." Although the manner of
giving notice is not specified in the statute, it is clear that personal
service is required. 9 The personal service requirement is complied
with if the notice is actually received by the person sought to be
charged or by his agent. In Jakenjo, Inc. v. Blizzard,' the court
recognized that service by mail is not expressly authorized by the
statute and that, therefore, mere proof of the mailing is probably not
sufficient. However, where actual receipt is shown, it is immaterial
whether such receipt is the result of delivery by the sheriff, or by a
postman, or some other person. In the Jakenjo case, a registered letter
had been sent by the subcontractor and was received by the secretary
of the resident agent of the corporation; a prior letter sent to the cor-
poration had been returned "unclaimed." The court concluded that
service upon the agent of a resident agent was sufficient to satisfy the
notice requirement.
In Bukowitz v. Maryland Lumber Company,' where a regis-
tered letter from a subcontractor was returned "refused," the court
denied that such delivery satisfied the notice requirement. The court
stated that nothing in the statute authorizes service by registered mail
if the letter does not actually reach the intended recipient. Moreover,
it was held in William Penn Supply Corporation v. Watterson,10 2
that the filing of a mechanics' lien within the period required for notice
did not constitute constructive notice of intention to claim a lien. The
court relied on Section 11, which specifically provides that a ma-
terialman is not entitled to a lien unless the required notice is given
in writing.
Notice can be served on someone outside the city or county,
despite statutory language suggesting the contrary.' ° The statutory
language apparently was intended to indicate to the subcontractor
that Section 12 offers an alternative means of giving notice when that
which is required by Section 11 is impossible.0 4 However, as stated
98. G. Edgar Harr Sonsv. Newton, 220 Md. 618, 155 A.2d 480 (1959).
99. Jakenjo, Inc. v. Blizzard, 221 Md. 46, 155 A.2d 661 (1959).
100. Id.
101. 210 Md. 148, 122 A.2d 486 (1956).
102. 218 Md. 291, 146 A.2d 420 (1958).
103. Jakenjo, Inc. v. Blizzard, 221 Md. 46, 50-51, 155 A.2d 661, 664 (1959):
"Certainly the requirement of Section 11, that notice be given to an owner or agent,
'if resident within the city or county,' does not preclude the giving of notice outside
of the county or city, if the owner or agent can be reached."
104. MD. ANN. COD art. 63, § 12 (1968) :
If such notice cannot be given on account of absence or other causes, the
claimant or his agent may, in the presence of a competent witness and within
ninety days, place said notice upon the door or other front part of said building
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in the Jakenjo case, "[S]ection 12 does not give a claimant an option,
but is available only where it is shown that there is no owner or agent
in the county where the work or materials are furnished, or there
are other reasons why the notice could not be given personally."' 5
The possibility of waiver of the notice requirement was discussed
in Welch v. Humphrey,"6 where the court held that the preliminary
notice may be waived by the owner, since the notice is required by the
statute merely for the owner's benefit. However, the court stated that
the notice requirement is waived only where the waiver has been
clearly and unequivocally expressed by the owner.
FILING OF A MECHANICS' LIEN CLAIM
Once notice of intention has been given to the owner, the next
step required to perfect the mechanics' lien is the filing of the claim.
As the court stated in Carson v. White :10T
No mechanic has . . . a lien on the house which he has built or
repaired, unless he has filed in the office of the clerk of Baltimore
County Court a statement of his demand, and in that statement
has given not only the sum due, but also the nature and kind of
the work done, and the kind and amount of the materials furn-
nished, and the time when the materials were furnished, and
the work done. 0 8
and shall file a claim with the clerk of the circuit court for the county or the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City, as the case may be, as hereinafter mentioned.
Notice by posting according to this section shall be sufficient in all cases where
the owner of the lot has died and his successors in title do not appear from the
public records of the county.
105. 221 Md. at 50, 155 A.2d at 664. See also Bounds v. Nuttle, 181 Md. 400, 30
A.2d 263 (1943); Hill v. Kaufman, 98 Md. 247, 56 A. 783 (1904); Kenly ex rel.
Otto v. Sisters of Charity, 63 Md. 306 (1885).
106. 200 Md. 410, 90 A.2d 686 (1958).
107. 6 Gill 17, 27 (Md. 1847).
108. This language is codified in MD. ANN. CoDE art. 63, §§ 17-19, (1968):
§ 17. Claim to be filed.
Each person entitled to such lien shall file a claim or statement of his
demand in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for the county
or the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, as the case may be, and such
claim or statement shall be redelivered by the clerk to the party filing
the same after it has been recorded as provided in § 18.
§ 18. Mechanics' lien docket.
The clerks of the circuit courts for the several counties and the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City shall each procure and keep a docket
or book to be called "The Mechanics' Lien Docket," in which he
shall record all designations or descriptions of lots or pieces of
ground and all claims which may be filed by virtue of this article
together with the day of filing the same and shall cause the names of
the owner of the lot of ground and of the contractor, architect or
builder, if such be named, and of the person claiming the lien under
this law to be recorded therein. Said docket or book shall contain an
index in which shall appear a reference to every lien so recorded, or
the clerk at his discretion shall maintain a separate index of the
liens so recorded.
§ 19. What claim must set forth.
Every such claim shall set forth: First, the name of the party
claimant and of the owner or reputed owner of the building, and
also of the contractor or architect, or builder, when the contract was
made by the claimant with such contractor, architect or builder;
second, the amount or sum claimed to be due and the nature or kind
[VOL. XXVIII
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Section 19 of Article 63 specifically enumerates what a claim must set
forth; namely (1) the name of the party claimant and the owner or
reputed owner of the building, and also of the contractor or archi-
tect; (2) the date of the contract between the claimant and the con-
tractor; (3) the amount claimed, the nature or kind of work or
materials furnished and the time when furnished; and (4) the locality
of the building and such description as may be necessary to identify it.
The claim must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court for the
particular county or the clerk of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City,
depending on where the work was done, within six months after "...
the work has been finished or the materials furnished .. "109 There
was some conflict of authority as to when "the work has been finished"
for the purposes of the six-month statutory period." However, the
conflict has apparently been resolved by Harrison v. Stouffer,"' in
which the court held that the words "the work has been finished" refer
to the work for which a lien may be taken, and are not to be considered
as synonymous with the completion of the building upon which the
work was done.
Delivery problems similar to those that exist with respect to the
notice provision have arisen with respect to the period within which
the claim must be filed. Generally, as in the case of the notice require-
ment, if the work was necessary for the proper performance of the
contract, the time period has been extended." 2
The statute requires that the claim separately designate the
amount claimed for each building if materials were supplied for two
or more buildings owned by the same person." 3 It is suggested that
of work or the kind and amount of materials furnished and the time
when the materials were furnished or the work done; thirdly, the
locality of the building and the number and size of the stories of
the same, or such other matters of description as may be necessary
to identify the same.
109. MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 23 (1968)
§ 23. Duration of lien; when claim must be filed.
Every such debt shall be a lien until after the expiration of six
months after the work has been finished or the materials furnished,
although no claim has been filed therefor, but no longer, unless a
claim shall be filed at or before the expiration of that period.
110. Compare Heath v. Tyler, 44 Md. 312 (1876) With Trustees of German
Lutheran Evangelical St. Matthew's Congregation v. Heise, 44 Md. 453 (1876).
111. 193 Md. 46, 65 A.2d 895 (1949).
112. The Court of Appeals, in Clark Certified Concrete Co. v. Lindberg, 216 Md.
576, 579, 141 A.2d 685, 686 (1958), said:
Where there are continuous deliveries [of materials] at a "going price", pursuant
to an undertaking to supply materials as needed, a lien may be filed within six
months from the delivery of the last item, provided such delivery is made in good
faith and not as a subterfuge to toll the statute.
See also Harrison v. Stouffer, 193 Md. 46, 65 A.2d 895 (1949).
113. MD. ANN. CODZ art. 63, § 21 (1968):
In every case in which one claim for materials shall be filed by the person pre-
ferring the same against two or more buildings owned by the same person, the
person filing such joint claim shall at the same time designate the amount he
claims to be due him on each of said buildings, otherwise such claim shall be
postponed to other lien creditors; and the lien of such claimant shall not extend
beyond the amount so designated as against other creditors having liens by judg-
ment, mortgage or otherwise.
A failure to apportion a claim does not defeat the claim, but postpones it to other lien
creditors. Caltrider v. Isberg, 148 Md. 657, 130 A. 53 (1925).
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claims for work performed and materials furnished, if made by the
same claimant, be similarly segregated, although failure to do so
would not appear to deny the right to the lien so long as the contract
price is set forth. The court has held that where a number of buildings
are being constructed as part of a single project, the lien claimant
need not specify how much of his materials went into each building."'
PREFERENCE OVER OTHER LIENS AND ENFORCEMENT
Section 15 of the statute specifically recognizes that mechanics'
liens have priority over "all mortgages, judgments, liens and encum-
brances which attach upon the said building or the ground covered
thereby subsequently to the commencement thereof." '115 Also, the
court has held that a mechanics' lien has preference over a subsequently
recorded deed of trust."' However, in Beehler v. Ijams," where a
deed creating a lease for ninety-nine years, renewable forever, was
executed prior to, but recorded after, the commencement of a building,
the court held that the mechanics' lien attached only to the leasehold
interest. The recording was deemed to relate back to the date of the
deed because of the timely nature of the recording.
The key to the question of preference is ascertaining the date of
commencement of the building. In Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons,
Inc.," 8 the court stated:
These cases make it clear that before there can be the commence-
ment of a building which would give a mechanics' lien claimant
a preference over a recorded mortgage there must be (i) a mani-
fest commencement of some work or labor on the ground which
everyone can readily see and recognize as the commencement of
a building and (ii) the work done must have been begun with
the intention and purpose then formed to continue the work until
the completion of the building. If either of these elements is
missing then there has been no "commencement of the building"
within the meaning of § 15 of Art. 63."'
In Brooks v. Lester,'20 cited in the Rupp case, it was held that the
commencement of a building is the first work, done on the ground
114. District Heights Apts. v. Noland Co., 202 Md. 43, 95 A.2d 90 (1953) ; Mary-
land Brick Co. v. Spilman, 76 Md. 337, 25 A. 297 (1892).
115. MD. ANN. CoDn art. 63, § 15 (1968):§ 15. Preference over other liens.
The lien hereby given shall be preferred to all mortgages, judgments,
liens and encumbrances which attach upon the said building or the
ground covered thereby subsequently to the commencement thereof;
and all the mortgages and liens other than liens which have attached
thereto prior to the commencement of the said building and which by
the laws of this State are required to be recorded shall be postponed to
said lien, unless recorded prior to the commencement of said building.
116. Rupp v. Earl H. Cline & Sons, Inc., 230 Md. 573, 577, 188 A.2d 146, 148
(1963): "[I]f any lienable work was done for or about the apartment site before the
recording of the deed of trust which could be said to be the 'commencement of [the]
building,' then the liens of the claimants would 'be preferred'."
117. 72 Md. 193, 19 A. 646 (1890).
118. 230 Md. 573, 188 A.2d 146 (1963).
119. Id. at 578, 188 A.2d at 149.
120. 36 Md. 65 (1872).
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which is made the foundation of the building, which forms a part of
the work suitable and necessary for its construction. On the other
hand, in Kelly v. Rosenstock,'2 1 the driving of stakes and a few hours
of leveling the ground was held not to be a sufficient commencement
of the building.
Perfecting the lien does not of itself entitle the claimant to
recover. Section 28 of Article 63 requires the bringing of a proceeding
in equity to enforce the lien within two years of filing.1 22 In Gaybis
v. Palm,123 decided under the then-existing Section 24 of Article 63,
the court, in discussing the appropriate proceedings to recover under
the lien, stated that the lienor must bring a bill in equity; if the bill
is successful, the court will order the sale of the specific property by
a court-appointed trustee. In all such cases, the proceedings are ex-
clusively in rem, the subject matter being the lien upon a specific
piece of property.
Provisions similar to those set forth in Section 24, which was
repealed in 1962, are now set forth in the Maryland Rules.1 24 These
rules cover the nature of the action brought by the lien holder and
the subsequent sale, payment and release of the lien. The court must
determine the rights of those entitled to share in the proceeds of sale
if the property subject to the mechanics' lien claim is sold under
judgment, foreclosure, execution or any other court order. 25  In
addition, Section 32 of Article 63 states that the mechanics' lien
article is to be construed as a remedial law, thereby permitting neces-
sary amendments to any proceeding concerning the filing or enforce-
ment of mechanics' liens. 26
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the major defect in the Maryland mechanics' lien law is
that it serves its purpose too well. It may go too far in the direction
121. 45 Md. 389 (1876).
122. MD. ANN. CODe art. 63, § 28 (1968):
§ 28. When lien expires.
The lien of every such debt for which a claim may have been filed
according to the provisions of this article shall expire at the end of
two years from the day on which it was filed, during which time the
claimant may bring proceedings in equity to enforce a lien, and the
owner of the property subject to the lien, or any other person in-
terested therein, may bring proceedings in equity to compel the
claimant to prove the validity of the lien or have it declared void
and the expiration of such lien shall be stayed by the filing, within
said two-year period, of any such proceeding in equity until the con-
clusion of such proceeding.
123. 201 Md. 78, 93 A.2d 269 (1952).
124. MD. R.P. BG 70-75.
125. MD. R.P. BG 74:
If all or any part of property against which a mechanics' lien claim is recorded
shall be sold under judgment, foreclosure, execution or any other court order or
by any trustee appointed by a court, before the extent of the mechanics' lien is
determined, the court from which such execution issued, or which entered such
judgment, passed such order or appointed such trustee, may determine the respec-
tive rights of the persons entitled to share in the proceeds of sale.
126. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 33 (1968): "Nothing contained in this
article shall be construed to affect the right of any person to whom any debt may be
due for work done or materials furnished to maintain any personal action against the
owner of the building or any other person liable therefor."
1968]
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of protecting the supplier of work or materials to the detriment of
the owner. An owner can, and frequently is, required to pay twice
for the same materials and labor in spite of the fact that he himself
is without fault. Contrary to statements contained in numerous de-
cisions, it is not always possible for an owner to protect himself
against a contractor's failure to make payment to a subcontractor.
Indeed, in practice it is almost impossible. Many contractors and
subcontractors have workers who must be paid on a weekly basis; it
is simply too onerous to require an owner or general contractor to
police the application of the money that he pays in good faith to the
company with which he contracts. The law could be revised to provide
that if payment to the general contractor is made in good faith, a
second payment to the subcontractor or materialman should not be
required. Such a revision would bring Maryland in line with many
other states which have adopted comparable provisions. However,
such a revision would also partially destroy the protection which the
statute was designed to provide. It seems clear that the statute should
at least be supplemented with provisions which would protect owners
from suppliers who continue to furnish materials to contractors and
subcontractors who are obviously in financial difficulty or who are
long delinquent in paying bills. Many suppliers, knowing full well that
they may recover from the owner through the lien device, continue to
extend credit and to send materials to a job even though they know,
or should know, that they may never receive payment from the con-
tractor or subcontractor. In addition, home buyers should be protected
from liens which are not filed at the time of settlement. Although
this would reduce the amount of protection given to subcontractors
and materialmen by the mechanics' lien statute, bona fide home buyers
should not be required to assume responsibility for miscalculations
on the part of builders or improvidence on the part of subcontractors
and materialmen. This is, perhaps, the most pressing area requiring
reform, and immediate remedial legislation should be enacted.
Originally, mechanics' lien laws were aimed at preserving the
equities of parties in situations where it was difficult for the parties
to protect themselves. It is submitted that owners and home buyers
have similar equities which are not adequately protected under cur-
rent law. The Legislature should undertake a substantial re-examina-
tion of the mechanics' lien law in order to weigh the equities of the
owners, on the one hand, and of potential lien claimants, on the other.
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EDITORS' NOTE
With the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company, the issue of the legality and propriety of the
use of inside information in securities transactions has finally crys-
talized. The far-reaching implications of that case and the problems
which it leaves unresolved are considered in Jeremy S. Wiesen's article,
Disclosure Of Inside Information - Materiality And Texas Gulf
Sulphur. Mr. Wiesen's article presents a highly perceptive analysis
of the intricate legal and economic issues which stem from private
disclosures of material inside information. Of particular interest is
Mr. Wiesen's thorough examination of the concept of materiality,
which has emerged as the central factor in the rapidly developing law
in this area. Because of the highly contemporary and controversial
nature of its topic, Mr. Wiesen's article should be of great value and
interest to the readers of the REVIEW.
The law of mechanics' liens has always been a topic of special
concern for Maryland attorneys because of the local origin of the
mechanics' lien and because of the complex, and often frustrating
problems which have always attended the interpretation of the Mary-
land mechanics' lien statute. The REVIEW'S current offering, The
Maryland Mechanics' Lien Law - Its Scope And Effect, submitted
by Mitchell S. Cutler and Leonard Shapiro, hopefully will resolve
some of these problems and provide a valuable source of information
for members of the bar.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
An issue of compelling contemporary significance, the legality of
the war in Vietnam, is the subject of Eric A. Belgrad's review of
Vietnam And International Law: An Analysis Of The Legality Of The
U.S. Military Involvement, a legal argument against the participa-
tion of the United States in the war prepared by the Consultative
Council of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Viet-
nam. Professor Belgrad reaches the inescapable conclusion that the
answer to the Vietnam dilemma lies in the consideration of practical
political solutions rather than the debate of largely academic legal issues.
A question of equal controversy is discussed in Edward Sofen's review
of Movies, Censorship, And The Law, an analysis of the legality of
methods of movie censorship written by Ira H. Carmen. Professor
Sofen recognizes the contribution of the book to the thought surround-
ing this perplexing problem, but points out with clarity the questions
which the book leaves unresolved.
After much deliberation, the Editorial Board of the REVIEW has,
with this issue, eliminated the Recent Development from the REVIEW
format. All student contributions will now be presented under the
general heading, Notes and Comments. Behind the Board's decision
was the recognition that the Recent Development, because of its brevity,
was seriously limited as an analytical tool and of only marginal value
as a vehicle for the reporting of useful legal information. The decision
was made with an eye toward reducing the inflexibility of the REVIEW
format by making the demands of the topic under consideration the
only criterion for the length of a student article. Hopefully this new
approach will provide an increased opportunity for good legal analysis
and a greater degree of flexibility in the choice of topics for student
treatment. Because this change in format marks a significant de-
parture from prior REVIEW practice, any comment from the readers
will be greatly appreciated. Among the first student articles to be
published under the new format is an exhaustive work in the law of
admiralty, The Law Of Unseaworthiness And The Doctrine Of Instant
Unseaworthiness. The issue also contains student notes on the avail-
ability of subrogation in medical service plans and insurance policies
and on the role of employers in group insurance plans.
The REVIEW is pleased to report the addition of Associate Pro-
fessor Robert E. Hicks to the staff of the University of Maryland
School of Law. During the current academic year, Professor Hicks
will instruct first year students in Procedure and legal method during
the fall term and will teach Administrative Law in the spring semester.
The REVIEW would also like to congratulate Professor William G. Hall,
Jr. on his promotion to Associate Dean and Professor and Professor
Edward A. Tomlinson on his elevation to Associate Professor.
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